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THE SECOND INJURY FUND
JAMES B. SLUSHER*
INTRODUCTION
The second injury fund is established to assist in the continuing fight
against the unemployment of those who are sufferers of some disability at
the time of their employment. The fund relieves an employer or his insurer
of the responsibilities of liability to an employee for any disability which
is not specifically attributable to an injury suffered while in the employ-
ment of that particular employer. The obvious, although not necessarily
the only, basis for this type of legislation rests in the belief that an em-
ployer will not hire a job applicant for work involving danger to the
extremities if that applicant has previously become disabled in an ex-
tremity. A man with only one leg might easily become permanently and
totally disabled if he were to lose his other leg in the roundhouse, and his
employer might choose to forego the risk of payments for this permanent
and total liability by using the simple expedient of hiring another switch-
man. Therefore, the creation of such a fund, and they exist in many states,
is a positive measure. It serves to encourage the hiring of individuals who
are already disabled to an extent which might render them susceptible to
further injury and disability.
For those not familiar with the Missouri Workmen's Compensation
Law it should be noted that there are two conditions of disability existing
which implicate the fund: (1) permanent partial disability; and (2) per-
manent total disability. Permanent partial disability is that disability to
an employee which is permanent in its duration, but which is an impair-
ment of his bodily function only to a degree that does not preclude some
form of gainful occupation by that employee.1 Permanent total disability
is that disability which is permanent in duration and which renders an
employee industrially unemployable. Section 287.020(8)2 defines "total
disability" in general terms as follows:
*Attorney, Kansas City, Mo.; A.B.; University of Missouri, 1953; LL.B.,
University of Missouri, 1958; Assistant, Missouri Attorney General, 1958-1961, dur-
ing which time represented the custodian of the second injury fund; Attorney, The
Vendo Company, Kansas City, Mo.
1. § 287.190(5), RSMo 1959.
2. § 287.020(8), RSMo 1959.
(328)
1
Slusher: Slushers: Second Injury Fund, The Symposium
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1961
THE SECOND INJURY FUND
The term 'total disability' as used in this chapter shall mean
inability to return to any employment and not merely mean in-
ability to return to the employment in which the employee was
engaged at the time of the accident.
I. PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY
That portion of section 287.220(1)' which is applicable to permanent
partial conditions of disability states:
... If any employee who has a permanent partial disability whether
from compensable injury or otherwise, receives a subsequent com-
pensable injury resulting in additional permanent partial dis-
ability so that the degree or percentage of disability caused by the
combined disabilities is greater than that which would have re-
sulted from the last injury, considered alone and of itself, and if
the employee is entitled to receive compensation on the basis of
the combined disabilities, the employer at the time of the last
injury shall be liable only for the degree or percentage of disability
which would have resulted from the last injury had there been no
preexisting disability. After the compensation liability of the
employer for the last injury, considered alone, has been determined
by a referee or the commission, the degree or percentage of em-
ployee's disability that is attributable to all injuries or conditions
existing at the time the last injury was sustained shall then be
determined by that referee or by the commission and the degree or
percentage of disability which existed prior to the last injury plus
the disability resulting from the last injury, if any, considered
alone, shall be deducted from the combined disability and com-
pensation for the balance, if any, shall be paid out of a special
fund known as the second injury fund, hereinafter provided for....
The simplest method of explanation of the meaning of this portion of
the law is to recite an example involving a claimant, John Doe. From what-
ever cause, either a congenital condition or a loss through some injury
during life, Doe has suffered the loss of his right thumb at the proximal
joint. This is a loss which is permanent in nature, and it is a partial
disability of Doe's body as a whole. Section 287.1904 allows compensation
for the loss of a thumb at the proximal joint for the value of 60 weeks.
Although Doe has the existing disability of the loss of his right thumb
he is nevertheless employed by his local city lumber yard, which is subject
3. § 287.220(1), RSMo 1959.
4. § 287.190, RSMo 1959.
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to the Workmen's Compensation Law, for the purpose of chopping down
small trees. One cold winter day, while working in his usual employment,
Doe erringly lets his left thumb slip into the path of his moving axe, and
he thereupon suffers a compensable disability by the loss of his left thumb
at the proximal joint.
John Doe has properly proceeded to a workmen's compensation hearing
before a referee of the Division, and presents his uncontested medical
report to the effect that his combined disability, his disability which is the
result of the loss of both thumbs, is 35 per cent of the body as a whole, or 140
weeks disability.
The referee accepts the facts and finds that John Doe has suffered a
compensable disability. The problem is in the apportionment of the liability
for this disability between the employer-insurer and the second injury fund.
In the words of section 287.220(1): ". . . the employer at the time of the
last injury shall be liable only for the degree or percentage of disability
which would have resulted from the last injury had there been no pre-
existing disability." Had Doe not previously lost his right thumb his
disability for the loss of the left thumb would have been adjudged to be
60 weeks. Therefore, the employer-insurer is liable for 60 weeks. This
period when added to the 60 weeks determined by the referee to be Doe's
preexisting disability, equals 120 weeks. This 120 weeks disability is then
subtracted from the combined disabilty, adjudged to be 140 weeks, and
leaves the second injury fund liable for 20 weeks disability. This disability
is allowed when Doe's resulting condition is permanent and partial.
II. PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY
That portion of section 287.220(1) which pertains to the liability of
the fund in permanent and total disability cases states:
. . . If the previous disability or disabilities, whether from com-
pensable injury or otherwise, and the last injury together result
in total and permanent disability, the employer at the time of the
last injury shall be liable only for the disability resulting from the
last injury considered alone and of itself; except that if the com-
pensation for which the employer at the time of the last injury
is liable, is less than the compensation provided in this chapter
for permanent total disability then in addition to the compensa-
tion for which the employer is liable and after the completion of
payment of the compensation by the employer, the employee
shall be paid the remainder of the compensation that would be
due for permanent total disability under section 287.200 out of a
special fund known as the second injury fund ....
[Vol. 26
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Assume John Doe, at the time of his employment, is suffering from
a preexisting disability which is permanent and partial in kind. He enters
upon his employment and has an accident which, had it not been for his
preexsting disability, would have rendered him 35 per cent disabled. However,
as a result of the combination of his disabilities, Doe is rendered permanently
and totally disabled. In these circumstances the employer-insurer becomes
liable only for the disability which would have resulted had Doe not
already been partially disabled. This liability is computed under section
287.190(3),' which provides that in case of permanent partial disability
compensation shall be paid for a period not to exceed 400 weeks. Thirty-
five per cent of 400 weeks would place the liability of the employer-
insurer at 140 weeks. The liability of the fund is then computed by sub-
tracting the 140 weeks of disability for the injury suffered while in Doe's
present employment from a total of 300 weeks, the period of compensation
provided by section 287.200(1) in cases of permanent total disability. This
would render the fund liable for 160 weeks of disability payments at one
salary rate, and then for the lifetime disability payments at another rate
provided by section 287.200(1)."
The above methods would appear to be the unquestioned meaning of
the statutes in computing the liabilities of the employer-insurer and the
fund in those or similar circumstances. There has been some contention
that when a permanent and total disability case exists the number of weeks
allowed for the last injury should be added to the weeks allowed for the
percentage of preexisting disability, and the sum of these two subtracted
from the 300 weeks allowed for a permanent and total case. This position
would be consistent with that used in computing the liabilities in a per-
manent and partial case, but it would be contrary to the apparent wording
of the statute.
That the two cases should be treated differently is somewhat sub-
stantiated by the case of Goebel v. Missouri Candy Co.,7 in which the St.
Louis Court of Appeals considered the situation in which the claimant had
a preexisting disability to his right hand, and then became a permanent
total disability case after the loss of his left hand. In considering the 1929
law which made the same distinction as the present section, the court
stated:
5. § 287.190(3), RSMo 1959.
6. § 287.200(1), RSMo 1959.
7. 227 Mo. App. 112, 50 S.W.2d 741 (St. L. Ct. App. 1932).
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It must be conceded, therefore, that it was the intention of the
Legislature in dealing with cases of permanent disability, where
there had been a previous disability, to make separate provision
for that class of cases in which the condition resulting from the
last injury is a permanent partial disability as against that class
of cases in which the resulting condition is a permanent total
disability."
Although there may be those who would oppose such a change it would
not appear to create an inequitable method of payment if in a permanent
and total disability case the number of weeks allowed for preexisting
disability, plus the weeks allowed for the injury over which the claim has
arisen, were substracted from the 300 weeks allowed in a permanent and
total case. As the law stands today the fund may be liable for practically
the entire 300 week allowance for disability, as well as for the lifetime
payments. Assume that John Doe has previously suffered, and has been
paid for, a 95 per cent permanent and partial disability to the body as a
whole. He would have been paid the value of 380 weeks disability. John Doe,
still suffering from his 95 per cent permanent and partial disability now goes
to work for a new employer and suffers another injury which would have
rendered him a 5 per cent disability had he not been previously disabled.
However, this 5 per cent disability when combined with his preexisting dis-
ability renders Doe permanently and totally disabled. The employer-insurer
under these circumstances would be liable only for 5 per cent disability to the
body, which would be 20 weeks, and the fund under the existing law would
have to pay the difference between 20 weeks and 300 weeks, or 280 weeks
plus the lifetime payments. There is a distinction, however, between this
situation and one in which the 95 per cent preexisting -disability was from a
non-compensable disability. In the example Doe will have been paid a total
of 660 weeks compensation for his disability which was not attributable to
his latest injury. Perhaps the Missouri Legislature should give this matter
its further attention.
IlL. PROCEDURE
Appeals involving the state treasurer as custodian of the second injury
fund must be brought from the circuit courts to the Supreme Court of
Missouri.'
8. Id. at 119, 50 S.W.2d at 744.
9. Mo. CONsT. art V, § 3; § 287.220(2), RSMo 1959; Mossman v. St. Joseph
Lead Co., 254 S.W.2d 241 (St. L. Ct. App. 1953).
[Vol. 26
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From January 1959 to January 1961 there were from 80 to 90 claims
filed annually against the fund. Of these, approximately 75 per cent were filed
in the St. Louis area, 10 per cent in Kansas City, and 15 per cent in the
other areas of the state. The Attorney General's office entered into settlement
agreements in the bulk of the claims, and of the number of the decisions ren-
dered by the referees upon a formal hearing only a relatively few cases were
appealed to the Industrial Commission by the claimants. From the full Com-
mission's decisions there were two appeals in the circuit courts of the state at
the end of December 1960. The number of claims being filed against the fund
is increasing every year, not only because of the growing work force
covered by the Workmen's Compensation Law, but also because of a grow-
ing consciousness on the part of claimants' attorneys that the fund exists.
One of the problems most frequently encountered has been that of
the applicability of the statute of limitations to a claim filed against the
fund. Section 287.43010 states:
No proceedings for compensation under this chapter shall be
maintained unless a claim therefor be filed with the commission
within one year after the injury or death, or in case payments
have been made on account of the injury or death, within one
year from the date of the last payment. The filing of any form,
report, receipt, or agreement, other than a claim for compensation,
shall not toll the running of the one year period provided in this
section. In all other respects such limitations shall be governed
by the law of civil actions other than for the recovery of real prop-
erty, but the appointment of a guardian shall be deemed the
termination of legal disability from minority or insanity.
This discussion will not deal with the problem of the time when an injury
should reasonably be discoverable. Sufficient case law exists, although not
involving the fund, to cover most cases involving this problem. The primary
question involving the fund would appear to be whether the fund is to be
considered a separate and distinct party which should be brought into a
case by a separate and distinct claim or amended claim. It has been urged
by some that once an original claim has been filed with the Commission
in accordance with the Workmen's Compensation Law the filing of an
amended claim making the fund a party defendant is merely an amendment
to the original claim, and that the time of filing the amended claim relates
back to the date of the filing of the original claim. It has been suggested
10. § 287.430, RSMo 1959.
1961]
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that in this situation the statute of limitations is not a bar to the remedy
against the fund even though the fund is not made a party to the cause
until after the twelve month period has elapsed. These positions would
hardly appear to be correct. The Kansas City Court of Appeals said, in
1942, that where a new party defendant is brought into the case by amend-
ment the statute of limitations continues to run until he is made a party
and the action is commenced against him."- It has also been held that if
an amendment sets up an entirely new and distinct claim or cause of action
from that embraced in the original petition or complaint, the running of
the statute is not arrested but instead may be interposed in bar of the
new claim or cause of action.12 This would appear to be appropriate when
an amended claim is filed against the fund.
It should not be difficult to concede that the fund should be considered
a separate defendant from any insurer against whom a claim is filed by
virtue of chapter 287. The law creates the fund, and the circumstances of
liability are not necessarily the same as those creating the liability of an
employer-insurer. The state treasurer is the custodian of the fund, and he
should be allowed the protective right of the statute of limitations with
respect to claims made against the fund.
There has also been an objection, in behalf of the state treasurer, to the
contention that when payments have been made, on account of an injury
to a claimant, by an employer-insurer, the statute of limitations is tolled
against the fund. In objecting to this contention it was felt that the leg-
islature intended that the payments referred to therein were only the pay-
ments by an employer-insurer and that the statute would only be tolled
against a claim which would be filed against this employer-insurer. There
is no authorization for the fund to make any payments prior to a decision
or order by the Division of Workmen's Compensation, except under cir-
cumstances involving the Board of Rehabilitation. s When payments have
been made by order of the Board the question remains with respect to
whether these payments toll the statute of limitations against the fund. In
all probability our courts would so decide.
Section 287.220 requires that before liability is affixed a compensable
injury must have been suffered. Failure to establish a compensable injury
would not only defeat a claim filed against an employer-insurer, but would
11. Martinson v. Schutte Lumber Co., 162 S.W.2d 312 (K.C. Ct. App.
1942); Daiprai v. Moberly Fuel & Transfer Co., 223 S.W.2d 474 (Mo. 1949).
12. Mitchell v. Health Culture Co., 349 Mo. 475, 162 S.W.2d 233 (1942).
13. § 287.141(3), RSMo 1959.
[Vol. 26
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as well preclude recovery from the fund. Therefore, it can easily be seen
that any defense which might be available to an employer-insurer, such as
a defense setting forth a failure of compliance with the statutory require-
ments, would also be available as a defense by the fund. It has been the
usual practice of the Division of Workmen's Compensation not to au-
thorize the settlement of a claim between a claimant and an employer-
insurer unless the claim is also settled and concluded against the fund. In
the normal situation there would be no reason for an independent settle-
ment or a hearing which would not include the fund, and there should be
no reluctance upon the part of an employer-insurer to assert those defenses
which would benefit both him and the fund. If the injury arising from the
second accident is not compensable there is liability neither by the fund
nor by an employer-insurer.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion it should be stated that other problems exist in the
application of the law to factual circumstances implicating the second
injury fund. This writing does not attempt to enlarge upon those cases
involving sight and hearing, nor upon those cases which arise because of
multiple injuries. They have not been predominant in the number of claims
filed.
It may also be stated that to this time the law has apparently served
its purpose, and has been susceptible to fair application. It should be
anticipated that cases involving the second injury fund will become an
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